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A B S T R A C T
Energy considerations are core to the missions of armed forces worldwide. The interaction between military
energy issues and non-military energy issues is not often explicitly treated in the literature or media, although
issues around clean energy have increased awareness of this interaction. The military has also long taken a
leadership role on research and development (R&D) and procurement of specific energy technologies. More
recently, R&D leadership has moved to the energy efficiency of home-country installations, and the development
of renewable energy projects for areas as diverse as mini-grids for installations, to alternative fuels for major
weapons systems. In this paper we explore the evolving relationship between energy issues and defense plan-
ning, and show how these developments have implications for military tactics and strategy as well as for civilian
energy policy.
1. Introduction
1.1. Military decision-makers confront an interconnected range of energy
challenges
Nations and organizations face an energy trilemma, which combines
concern for energy economics and affordability with a desire for en-
vironmental protection and assured energy security. Addressing all
three considerations together has proven to be a difficult challenge for
energy policymakers. In this paper, we address the interface of defense
policy and energy policy—the relationship between defense policy
(including for technological innovation) and energy supply and use.
This domain of concern is linked to issues sometimes referred to as
“energy and security”, which is separate from the notion of “energy
security” as conventionally conceived. Energy and security, as dis-
cussed in this paper, involves the role of energy technology and policy
and its influence on military mission objectives.
The drivers for energy decision-making in the non-military sectors
of the economy are largely economic. The energy system consists of
mostly privately-owned energy assets interacting with public policy and
regulatory frameworks to ensure economic competitiveness and social
welfare via energy affordability, to provide reliable energy access and
services (sometimes termed “energy security”), and to adhere to en-
vironmental regulations and goals in areas such as climate change, air
pollution, and water quality. The core of the concept of energy security
in a globalized energy market is represented by attempts to reduce the
negative impacts of supply and price shocks through efficiency, di-
versified supplies, and fuel choices [1], although many other expanded
indicators of energy security are often used [2–8]. “Environment” is
represented by state, federal and international efforts to minimize air,
water, and waste impacts associated with energy, and to encourage new
energy sources with fewer greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In military
energy decision-making, the underlying economic, security, and en-
vironmental drivers of energy decision-making exist, but the military
translates and applies these concepts very differently. In the domain of
defense, energy has the potential to be both an enabler of hard power
but also, via denial, arguably itself to be a weapon of war. One of the
motivations for this paper is to make clear that conventional paradigms
of energy security (relating to economic prosperity and social harmony)
should not be confused with security in the military-energy nexus (fo-
cused on the potential for hard power and willful coercion). Defense
energy and security efforts are more directed at achieving military
mission and strategic objectives.
Energy considerations have long been essential to mission delivery
of armed forces worldwide. These include operations in theater of
conflict, for land, air, and water transport, and for installations and
forward operating locations. More recently, the topic has risen around
clean energy and new challenges facing the military [9–22]. Energy
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enables nearly everything the military does, and the primary objective
is mission assurance and decisive advantage on the battlefield. So “se-
curity” is derived through energy powering capable major weapons
systems and communications infrastructure at the desired levels of
performance, range, and readiness. But resupplying energy to combat
theaters and the battlespace edge is a vulnerability, so security is also
derived through minimizing the energy required for vehicles and for-
ward locations. Reducing and diversifying fuel use are also drivers
behind economic considerations of military energy use. The US De-
partment of Defense (DoD) is the largest US government user of energy
[23], and within overall constrained budgets volatile energy costs re-
present a source of a risk to military operations and maintenance needs.
Finally, defense policy makers must choose paths that strengthen en-
vironmental performance objectives, which in the US are driven by
Departmental and Federal guidelines. Environmental performance also
contributes to maintaining DoD's social license to operate. That social
license might represent an engagement and maintenance of support
with host communities, whether home or abroad.
The world's militaries have also for more than a hundred years taken
a leadership role in research and development (R&D), and procurement
of emerging technologies – especially where they are applicable in
combat theaters [24–27]. Over many decades that leadership has in-
volved issues relating to energy supply and use. Recently this interest
has expanded to include stronger consideration of resource efficiency
and environmental impacts. There has been increased emphasis on the
efficiency of home-country installations, and the development of un-
conventional energy projects, including renewables, for areas as diverse
as micro-grids and mini-grids for installations, to alternative fuels for
major weapons systems such as aircraft and ships. Different countries
are approaching the evolving military-energy challenges in different
ways and with different emphasis. In this paper, we emphasize the
policies and actions of the United States (US) given its current globally
leading role in defense. We also consider some earlier historical British
experiences. We also comment on the role of energy considerations in
the work of the United Nations, particularly in peacekeeping opera-
tions.
For our analysis of the US government and military, we mostly focus
on the period 2009–2011. We chose this period because it represents a
peak in real enacted US defense expenditures. Real US defense ex-
penditures rose sharply after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001
to support overseas contingency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq,
before peaking in FY2010 and then declining [28,29]. We note that
recent U.S. DoD enacted budgets in Fiscal Year 2018 and 2019 have
been higher than in 2013–2017 [30]. However, here we focus on the
2009–2011 period of real maximum expenditure.
Military decision-making under the confluence of these security,
economic, and environmental objectives, has over decades coalesced to
create a new and adaptive energy policy for the DoD, and hence for the
United States. This confluence of objectives will continue to shift the
technologies and strategies that will be used to power the military, and
which, in time, can be expected to shape civilian technologies as well.
1.2. Defense and civilian energy
Despite our claims for defense exceptionalism, in some scenarios,
the military concerns of defense and energy can collide with civilian
energy security issues. One point of contact relates to energy prices as
faced by defense agencies and ministries, but the challenges can run
deeper. For instance, The International Energy Agency (IEA) was es-
tablished in November 1974, after an economic and political crisis in
1973–1974. The crisis emerged from the 1973 ‘Yom Kippur’ war and
the oil embargo response of the Organization of Arab Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OAPEC). OAPEC was distinct from ‘OPEC’, a
broader body established earlier in 1960, including, for instance,
Venezuela and other non-middle eastern states. The industrialized west
had become dependent upon petroleum imports from Arab countries
and in the face of OAPEC production cuts, prices rose dramatically [31].
As Scott [31] notes: “The industrial countries permitted excessive and
even wasteful and inefficient use of energy and of oil in particular. Energy
conservation measures in those countries were woefully underdeveloped.
Their oil production potential was not fully realized, nor was sufficient in-
vestment devoted to the development of other energy sources as alternatives
to oil. They had yet to devise a workable system for responding to serious
disruptions in oil supply; and their organizational arrangements for co-op-
eration could not enable them to cope effectively with the institutional im-
plications of those situations.”
The IEA itself is based upon an international treaty: The
International Energy Program Agreement of 1974 and amended in
1992. The measures included a legally binding oil sharing mechanism
and the creation of a strong Secretariat based in Paris. Chapter 6 of the
Agreement established a “framework of consultation with oil compa-
nies”. The IEA member states are required to maintain strategic pet-
roleum reserves among which, the US has the largest. Formally, IEA
members operate their strategic petroleum reserves autonomously and
may use their stocks for national purposes [31]. US emergency draw-
downs from its Strategic Petroleum Reserves have historically been
coordinated with the IEA [32]. The primary purpose of IEA strategic
petroleum reserves is to stabilize global markets in times of turbulence.
Coordinated release can meet market demand during supply disrup-
tions to reduce price volatility. Arguably such planning lies within the
conventional paradigm of energy security. There is however the po-
tential for another dimension to the existence of strategic energy re-
serves. One can easily imagine conflict scenarios threatening energy
supply chains such that military planners might wish to conserve stra-
tegic reserves and use them to meet military energy needs. Any desire
to retain stocks in the face of system stress would run directly counter to
the economist's preference to alleviate supply scarcity in the market.
Additionally, for countries with domestic oil production such as the US,
it is likely that under such a scenario the military would be the first
buyer of any domestically produced fuels, and the US Defense Pro-
duction Act enables the President to prioritize energy procurement for
national security [33].
It would be incorrect to assume that the world of defense energy and
security is full of change and uncertainty while the civilian concerns of
energy security are more static and stable. Not so very long ago US
political rhetoric concerning “energy independence” appeared to be
merely fanciful and populist. The revolution in natural gas and oil
production in North America arising from the hydraulic fracturing and
horizontal drilling of shale deposits has in a few years utterly trans-
formed the energy landscape of the United States. The US has gone from
being a predicted major importer of oil and natural gas to a prospective
major exporter [34]. The long-term consequences of this shift for the
world of energy and defense remain to be seen. Two important possi-
bilities are in prospect. First, the potential creation of a free-standing
global spot market for natural gas independent of the oil market, and
second, a shift in the security challenges of the United States in seeking
to stabilize that emergent global market alongside an oil market of
diminishing direct relevance to US interests.
Historically, defense-related research and development has affected
technological change in broader areas of the economy [24], but re-
quires specific organizational structures to fully realize many of these
spillovers [35]. Civil aviation has been built upon a series of twentieth
century military innovations, many forged in conflict. These include:
gas turbines (jet engines), airframes, radar, cabin pressurization, de-
icing, and many more [24,36–38]. In space, the reliance on satellite-
based technologies in communications, geo-positioning and earth ob-
servation (e.g. weather forecasting) were all made possible by govern-
ment and military R&D and procurement in rocketry and space-based
technologies of nuclear deterrence [27,39]. In this paper, we posit a
looming transformation in energy both military and civilian domains.
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1.3. Structure of the paper
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly
discusses historical energy drivers for the military and the energy im-
petus included in modern defense planning. Section 3 describes DoD
operational and installation energy, and expounds on the evolving
confluence of military energy policy. Section 4 provides conclusions
and observations. While we will highlight the factors shaping the en-
ergy and defense agenda, we exclude from consideration in this paper
the ways defense planning will adapt to incorporate climate change
impacts (see, for example, [40]). Climate change impacts can be direct,
such as changes to surface shipping routes and military logistics or af-
fecting military installations [41–44], but could also be indirect, such as
increasing regional pressures on natural resources and potentially ac-
celerating conflict [44,45]. Scholars are continuing to assess the
strength of the links between climate change and conflict [46], and we
and others will examine aspects of such matters in future work. But here
we simply concur with former U.S. diplomat and national security ad-
viser Leon Fuerth when he observes;
“In the realm of military thinking, it is standard practice to consider
worst-case scenarios as a way to avoid settling on insufficiently ro-
bust courses of action. Also in military thinking, it is standard to pay
serious attention to low-probability, high-damage events (e.g. nu-
clear war). Where climate change is concerned, however, our
thinking tends toward best-case outcomes, for no real reason other
than the inconvenience of the possible truth. Planning for climate
change needs to shift toward worst-case scenarios, especially be-
cause trends in the physical evidence are all pointing in that direc-
tion.” [47].
2. The past and present of Energy's role in defense planning
2.1. Historical linkage of war and energy
Energy has played a role in every facet of war from troops in gar-
rison and defensive planning to mobilization and attack. The need to
deliver adequate and timely energy supplies to military for-
ces—particularly to those in the most forward-deployed locations—has
long existed as a strategic vulnerability to the success of military
campaigns. Targeting materiel supply channels in an effort to reduce
adversaries' operational strength has often been employed as an effec-
tive tactic. In addition, the logistics to deliver a reliable energy supply
has been a recurring theme in the story of both successful and un-
successful military operations [22].
Many of the lessons learned during the world wars of the 20th
century are still being appreciated and relearned in today's conflicts.
One of the most famous examples of energy influencing military
strategy comes from 1911, when Winston Churchill, then First Lord of
the Admiralty, converted the British fleet fromWelsh coal to foreign oil.
The resulting gain in speed and decrease in logistical burden gave the
British Royal Navy a critical advantage over the Axis powers [48]. The
action proved decisive and enabled the allied power to “float to victory
on a sea of oil” [49]. The policy brought with it further advantage as the
less smoky combustion of oil allowed the Royal Navy to avoid produ-
cing the tell-tale plume of dark coal smoke that could so easily reveal a
fleet's position [50]. In parallel to British developments, the shift from
coal to oil was also underway in the smaller United States Navy
throughout the First World War, but powered by domestic oil (primarily
from Oklahoma, Texas and California) [51].
While the shift from coal to oil was a decisive one for Winston
Churchill and for the Royal Navy, the history of the First World War
further reveals its status as the first major conflict fought, in part for
energy. British strategy, reinforced by the Battle of Jutland (May 31st to
June 1st 1916), relied on a blockade denying Germany and its allies
access to global supply chains including most notably food, but also oil
and other industrial resources. Even before the war, there had been a
competition for access to Persian Gulf oil with, on the one hand
Germany seeking to establish a Berlin to Baghdad railway, and on the
other Britain establishing commercial oil operations in the region,
among which Anglo-Persian Petroleum was the most prominent [52].
During the war, access to oil became a pressing concern for both sides.
According to Paul [53], Secretary to the British War Cabinet Sir
Maurice Hankey went so far as to say about Mesopotamian oil that
“Control of these oil supplies becomes a first-class war aim”. Following
victory, Britain and France initially divided access to all Mesopotamian
oil between them, but then the British out-maneuvered France going
into the Versailles peace conference and secured exclusive access to
Mesopotamian oil via a new League of Nations protectorate called Iraq
[52,53].
As the militaries of the world shifted during the early twentieth
century toward oil as the main energy source, energy security and
geopolitical positioning became important planning and operational
variables. The resulting scramble to secure oil supplies heavily influ-
enced events leading to and throughout WWII. Some of the greatest
military strategic decisions in World War II had their roots in a desire to
access energy resources. Operation Barbarossa – Nazi Germany's failed
invasion of Russia (June–December 1941) is frequently presented as an
attempt by Hitler to access Soviet oil resources. Germany later captured
the Maikop oil field in November 1942, but was overstretched and
lacked the equipment to bring the field back into production [54]. The
German military's perceived need for oil created a two-front war and
their failure to take and hold the oil fields spelled disaster at Stalingrad
and changed the tide on the eastern front [55].
In the Asia-Pacific theater, the need for oil and other resources
shaped Japanese military and foreign policy both before and during the
war. Much like the surprise attacks in operation Barbarossa, the
Japanese surprised the American naval fleet on December 7, 1941 in an
attempt to secure oil shipping lanes [55,56]. Previously, at the initiative
of US Secretary of State Dean Acheson, the US had effectively blocked
oil exports to Japan in July 1941 following Japan's invasion of French
Indochina which in turn had followed Germany's defeat of France in
Europe. Fearing that any mitigating response would prompt conflict,
Japan decided to act aggressively and near simultaneously attacked
Pearl Harbor in the Central Pacific, Hong Kong, and Malaya [56]. These
attacks were at the heart of a Japanese strategy to secure oil and other
natural resources, such as rubber, from South East Asia. Japan used the
term “Southern Resource Area” to describe its sphere of wider influence
[57], while true vassal states joined the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere. As such, Japan's assertion that it was ridding the region of
European colonial rule surely had a rather hollow ring.
Energy's link to conflict in WWII had as much to do with the denial
of resources to the enemy as it did to securing one's own oil supply
chains. The stalling of General Patton's Third Army following its cam-
paign across France in August and September 1944 is a telling example
of fuel acting as a “tether” to military operations [58]. At the time,
Patton's army was more than 100 miles closer to Berlin than any other
Allied army. While Patton had the advantage on the battlefield, he the
disadvantage of being tethered to an energy source located hundreds of
miles away. Years later, in 1970, war strategist Sir Basil Hart described
the delay as the “unforgiving minute” and that the “best chance for a
quick finish”, to the war, “was probably lost when the gas was turned
off on Patton's tanks.” [55].
While the skill of logistics forces in providing fuel has grown sig-
nificantly since World War II, many leaders in the military are mindful
of the operational implications of fuel's logistical requirements. General
James N. Mattis (Retired) highlighted the enduring criticality of logis-
tics—energy logistics in particular—when he echoed the call of General
Patton and entreated the U.S. DoD to “unleash us from the tether of
fuel” as a result of his experience leading U.S. Marines into Iraq in 2003
[59]. A test deployment in 2010 of portable solar-powered generation
systems at U.S. Marine forward operating bases in Afghanistan reduced
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the bases' diesel generator usage by more than 90%—drastically redu-
cing the need for risky and costly fuel convoys to keep these bases
supplied with energy [60].
The Twentieth Century saw energy figure ever more centrally as a
driver of conflict, a strategic factor and a tactical consideration in war.
The trend extended through the end of the Twentieth and into the
Twenty-first Century. For example, the energy intensity of war fighting
grew by a factor of 16 and the oil-intensity of the individual soldier rose
2.6% annually from 1970 to 2010 [61]. This military evolution and
decades of technological innovation has, until very recently, not sub-
stantially reduced the mission-criticality of fuel supplies. For this
reason, it has become an important area of research, development and
defense planning.
2.2. Energy and modern defense planning
There is a vast and evolving literature on energy security as seen
from the perspective of civilian energy policy-makers the framing of
such considerations, and frequently gives emphasis to the concerns of
energy economics and involves notions of security of supply and se-
curity of demand for those involved in energy-based trade. Here we
focus on defense energy and security–those instances where energy is
directly related to armed conflict, the threat of such conflict, military
facilities, or concerns in the clear confines of foreign diplomacy. In the
Twentieth Century, this was primarily associated with the global oil
sector or the use of fossil fuels for troop movements, although the story
of the use of nuclear energy for submarine warfare and naval nuclear
deterrence is another important example of defense-energy synergies.
The high energy density of nuclear fuel made possible the strategic
doctrine of Continuous At Sea Deterrence (CASD) in which Ship
Submersible Ballistic Nuclear (SSBN) submarines hide in deep blue
water awaiting orders from the Commander in Chief to move to launch
depth and deploy the onboard missiles. The nuclear reactor made
possible the ultimate second strike nuclear weapons system able to
deliver massive retaliation consistent with either counter-force or
counter-value goals. Meanwhile ranged against every SSBN force are a
set of nuclear-powered attack submarines designed to neutralize an
enemy deterrent early in a conflict. Arguably this whole defense en-
terprise was enabled by an energy technological innovation – the
controlled nuclear fission reactor.
2.2.1. Geostrategic risk
The need to secure oil supplies and to maintain the stability of world
oil markets has played a major role in shaping US foreign policy and
dictating US military strategy and deployment [62,63]. While DoD's
own petroleum demand is a relatively small portion of US petroleum
needs, it experiences a unique feedback loop in adding to the energy
and defense concerns that arguably have partially motivated US mili-
tary action in the first place.
2.2.2. Increased dependence
The international, US-led, operations in Iraq (since 2003) and
Afghanistan (since 2001) have illuminated the increased cost and in-
tensity of energy use in modern theaters of conflict. In World War II, the
United States consumed about a gallon of fuel per soldier per day, in the
1990–91 Persian Gulf War, about 4 gallons of fuel per soldier was
consumed per day. In 2006, the US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
burned about 16 gallons of fuel per soldier on average per day, almost
twice as much as the year before [48].
2.3. Energy and defense - the role of the United Nations
The United Nations (UN) has had a leading role in attempting to
mitigate climate change caused by human activities. In Rio di Janeiro
Brazil in 1992, the UN created the Framework Convention on Climate
Change, which was followed in 1997 by The Kyoto Protocol. The in-
tention of the Convention [64] (UNFCCC, 1992) was that major de-
veloped industrial countries would lead the way in greenhouse gas
emissions reductions. Developing countries, most notably China, were
exempt from any obligation to limit or reduce emissions and the United
States, although a signatory to the Convention never ratified the Kyoto
Protocol. While one might argue that global emissions are lower than
they would have been in the absence of the Convention, the Protocol
and UN concern generally, it is clear that this high-profile UN initiative
has so far failed to live up to the early expectations of its proponents.
Global environmental protection was not a founding mission of the
UN—it was conflict prevention that motivated and shaped the UN's
mission. It was conceived by the Allied Powers in 1942 in the depths of
World War II in a Declaration by United Nations [65], and the UN charter
reveals an ongoing focus on international peace and security [66]. In
the domain of defense energy and security, it is in UN work to support
the core function of peacekeeping that one can find tangible examples
of environmental progress.
2.3.1. UN peacekeeping
UN Peacekeeping is noteworthy for the explicit policy consideration
given to the minimization of negative environmental impacts. While
military forces devoted to warfighting must necessarily prioritize
narrow military objectives, the special focus of peacekeeping operations
permits, and arguably even requires, a different balance of priorities in
what is fundamentally a military enterprise.
UN peacekeeping operations consist of around 115,000 staff in 16
countries (at the end of 2012) and represent 55% of the emissions of the
entire UN system [67]. The largest share of emissions for peacekeeping
operations is due to air travel (46%), followed by power generation
(26%) and road vehicles (15%). Until 2009, the decisions regarding the
adoption of renewable energy sources and of energy efficiency mea-
sures were generally handled at the single mission level, lacking any
general UN-wide policy in the area, despite the potential for cost sav-
ings [68].
The UN then initiated a policy of reduction of its environmental
impact in all of its operations, including its energy consumption for the
field missions, and to pursue also other environmental goals following
the spirit and the indications of the Seventh Millennium Development
Goal (MDG7) to ensure environmental sustainability. Two instruments
have been adopted: the first is the Environmental Policy for the UN Field
Missions, adopted by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(DPKO) and by the Department of Field Support (DFS), the second is a
Global Field Support Strategy adopted by the General Assembly
[68,69,111]. These policies are mandatory and include many areas of
the environmental sustainability of peacekeeping operations, including
camp management issues (such as the use of water, wastewater, solid
and hazardous waste, wildlife, and energy). The adoption of these po-
licies provides minimum environmental standards and operational
guidance for all field missions.
The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) affirmed
that one obstacle to the adoption of energy efficiency and renewable
energy technologies in the field is that the field mission's length is often
unknown in advance and consequently a future-oriented cost-benefit
analysis of renewable technologies becomes difficult [68]. In many
cases the technologies to be deployed are chosen on the base of the
initial length of the mission, typically six to twelve months, while the
average length of a mission is far longer, typically seven years. Ex-
perience from the implementation in UN peacekeeping operation of
sustainable energy and energy efficiency measures points to a cost-re-
covery payback time of one to five years [68]. The benefits that surely
exist are being missed as a result of an excessively short-term mindset in
project planning and approvals. Part of the solution could be to allow
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for time horizons to be considered for cost benefit analysis that exceed
the authorization period of the mission in question at the time of as-
sessment.
There have been some successful cases of sustainable energy inter-
vention in UN peacekeeping operations. The mission in Timor-Leste
(UNMIT) established an environmental committee that monitored en-
ergy use and adopted energy efficiency measures, including staff
practices, and used solar energy for isolated applications. These prac-
tices led to a saving of around 335,000 USD per year. The UN Interim
Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has implemented the UN's 2009 policies:
putting in place environmental guidelines and an action plan for the
mission, and a complete Environmental Management System (EMS)
that manages all environmental related aspects of the mission. The
measures adopted include the introduction of efficient transport ve-
hicles, efficient electricity generators and building chillers, and the
implementation of solar PV generation. In Darfur, UN-Afircan Union
Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) forces have helped local women
with their energy needs and security, escorting them regularly when
collecting wood for fuel outside the camp, and also introducing efficient
cook-stoves reducing the consumption of firewood by up to 80%. These
measures greatly reduced the risks of assault and violence for the
women, particularly during the agricultural cultivation season [68].
Notwithstanding these cases, UNEP notes also that the new policy
guidelines are still to demonstrate sufficient results on the ground, and
UNEP further stresses the importance of an initial focus on training,
monitoring and reporting activities and of the creation of an
Environmental Baseline Studies and of Environmental Impact
Assessments for field missions. Furthermore, UNEP suggests that a
dedicated environmental officer should be appointed to each mission
and that this person should report directly to senior level staff.
The extent to which UN concern for environmental impacts in
peacekeeping is linked to the role of the organization is attempting to
enhance global sustainability and a low-carbon future can be debated,
but it is clear that the desire to be seen to lead by example is under-
pinning actions by the UN to reduce the harmful environmental impacts
of its own activities.
2.3.2. Energy and defense in a military alliance - NATO
The NATO approach to energy issues is taken through an energy and
defense lens, both for its member countries and of its operations. NATO
debated its approach to “energy security” in 2006, and convened this
theme to be of central importance for the alliance and further mandated
its member countries to define its role1 [70–73]. One of the con-
sequences of this decision is that a NATO Energy Security Centre of
Excellence was founded in Lithuania (NATO ENSEC COE) in 2012. The
Centre will join the family of the other NATO COE and will provide 1)
strategic analysis and research; 2) development of doctrine, standards
and procedures; 3) education, training and exercise and 4) consulta-
tions [74]. Some work in this area has already started, in particular
NATO members are collaborating to exchange smart energy solutions to
reduce fossil fuel consumption in their respective militaries, and reduce
the threat to the environment [75].
The problem of fuel consumption and of the security of fuel supplies
has particularly affected the largest NATO operation in history
Afghanistan. In late 2012 ISAF forces amounted to more than one
hundred thousand troops consuming more than 1.8 million gallons of
fuel (6.8 million liters) every day, 99% of which delivered by truck
from abroad. The fuel travelled through Pakistan but, after an air attack
that accidently killed 24 Pakistani soldiers in 2011, the border was
closed by the Pakistan government and NATO forces were forced to
shift all the supply of energy to the North, through the Northern
Distribution Network (NDN), a rail link of more than 5000 km starting
from Latvia, traversing Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan until the city
of Termez, where trains are offloaded and the fuel is moved to trucks
that cross the border to Afghanistan.2 It should not have come as a
surprise when Foreign Policy described this logistic network as a
“nightmare” [76–78].
The long-standing vulnerabilities and difficulties of fuel logistics
seen in World War I and World War II are so far undiminished despite
enormous progress in military technology. In fact, in some aspects these
vulnerabilities have grown as the energy intensity of conflict has in-
creased.
2.4. Positing the prospect of a future revolution in military affairs
As in previous conflicts, the U.S. military has used technologies and
strategies to adapt to the new challenges experienced in the wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq. The rapid increase in use of remotely piloted
aircraft (aka “drones”) in these theaters signaled a realization of the
“revolution in military affairs” that drones represented (see, for ex-
ample [79–81]). A revolution in military affairs, or RMA, “involves a
paradigm shift in the nature and conduct of military operations”
[81,82]. The literature cites many past examples of RMAs that have
changed warfare, including precision strike munitions, nuclear
weapons, the aircraft carrier, radar, and even the English-developed
longbow from the thirteenth century. RMAs can be technological, but
can also result from the emergence of new strategies, doctrine and
decision-making [81]. We argue that the new ways that the military
plans for, uses, and manages energy could represent a future RMA that
could transform DoD acquisitions and operations, and enhances the
capabilities of the fighting force. In this way, the military would break
free of the risks and difficulties seen in conflicts over at least the last
100 years.
As we have seen, resupplying energy to combat vehicles and the
warfighter has long been a vulnerability and area of desired improve-
ments by the military. Throughout the military literature, there has
long been a desire of enhancing the ratio of the fighting “tooth” of the
military to the supporting logistics “tail” (see, for example [40,83,84]).
The size and requirements of the tooth of the fighting force directly
affect the size and requirements of the resupplying tail. For example,
when combat vehicles and warfighters deploy to theaters, they require
additional vehicles and personnel as combat support elements (such as
medical, supplies and other needs), and these combat support elements,
themselves require resupply from other combat service support ele-
ments along the tail. This results in cascading vehicle, personnel and
supply requirements from the tooth to the tail. In World War II, average
fuel demand per soldier was about 1 gallon per day. As noted earlier,
this has increased to 15 to 20 gallons per solider in Operation Iraqi
Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom [85]. The long-standing
challenges of fuel logistics are undiminished and arguably becoming
worse. The vulnerability of such supply lines was exploited by enemy
fighters, and contributed to about one U.S. Marine Corps casualty for
every fifty convoys in Afghanistan [86]. A separate estimate [87] dis-
tinguished FY (Fiscal Year) 2007 Army solider and civilian casualties by
energy and water convoys. In Iraq, the Army study found 1 casualty for
every 39 fuel convoys and every 63 water convoys. For, Afghanistan the
casualty factors were higher- 1 casualty for every 24 fuel convoys and
1 Article 45 of the NATO Riga declaration in 2006 states that: “As underscored
in NATO's Strategic Concept, Alliance security interests can also be affected by the
disruption of the flow of vital resources. We support a coordinated, international
effort to assess risks to energy infrastructures and to promote energy infrastructure
security. With this in mind, we direct the Council in Permanent Session to consult on
the most immediate risks in the field of energy security, in order to define those areas
where NATO may add value to safeguard the security interests of the Allies and, upon
request, assist national and international efforts.”
2 Another route of the NDN bypasses Russia, starting with the Georgian port
of Poti, and goods travel through Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea, Kazakhstan and
still reach Afghanistan through the Termez bottleneck in Uzbekistan.
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every 29 water convoys [87]. These casualties incurred during resupply
have intensified DoD's efforts to reduce this strategic security vulner-
ability. Reducing energy and water requirements for the fighting tooth
represents a significant and realizable opportunity to shift the funda-
mental tooth-to-tail ratio in the Armed Services.
Two other factors have recently shaped military energy decision-
making. The first is the increased focus on the costs of military energy.
In FY 2011, DoD consumed 939 PJ (890 trillion British thermal units or
BTU) of energy, which was approximately 1% of U.S. energy con-
sumption and 80% of U.S. federal energy consumption [88], at a cost of
$19.3 billion [89]. DoD spent approximately 90% of these FY2011
energy costs on petroleum products. In FY2011, DoD consumed roughly
117 million barrels of petroleum (Schwartz et al., 2012), approximately
2% of total U.S. petroleum consumption in 2011 [88]. In FY 2011, jet
fuel alone accounted for nearly 60% of total DoD energy consumption,
while all petroleum-based fuels supplied about 80% [88]. Despite a 4%
decrease in DoD's petroleum consumption between FY 2005 and FY
2011, the agency's petroleum expenditures over the same period rose
381% in real terms due to rising oil prices [90]. While still a relatively
small portion of DoD's total spending (2.5% in FY 2011), the $17.3
billion spent on fuel in FY 2011 is large in absolute terms. In the two
decades after 1990, the DoD's cost of buying fuel increased faster than
health care, personnel and every other major DoD budget category
[90]. Additionally, petroleum price volatility has negatively affected
DoD operating budgets and created large unfunded obligations [90].
The second other factor affecting military energy decision-making is
the requirement for the DoD to improve energy efficiency, use renew-
able energy, and energy management as directed through several leg-
islative and executive actions. From the National Energy Conservation
Policy Act enacted in 1978 to the Energy Independence and Security
Act of 2007, to Executive Order 13514 signed in 2009, a bevy of federal
mandates have sought to demonstrate the federal government's own
leadership in fostering sustainability and reducing greenhouse gas
emissions by setting aggressive goals for federal agencies. These goals
are aimed at reducing water and energy intensity and petroleum con-
sumption, and at increasing the use of renewable, efficient, and alter-
native energy technologies. These goals and mandates range from re-
quirements to develop and implement energy and water management
strategies; efficiency standards for acquisition of new energy-con-
suming products, equipment, and vehicles; and percentage targets for
the use of renewable energy-generated electricity. Additionally, several
of the annual National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA) that fund
the Department of Defense have included Congressional language that
affects energy use in weapons platforms as well as on installations.
It is clear that the dependence of US military operations of extended
and vulnerable fuel supplies is unsustainable on many levels. A
Revolution in Military Affairs could arise whereby innovative tech-
nology in energy supply and use could reduce the need for extended
fuel supply lines. Reduced external energy needs through device,
motor, and housing efficiency and distributed energy resources at
combat outposts and forward operating bases could reduce the amount
of transported fuel required to serve these locations. Increased effi-
ciency of tactical and non-tactical vehicles could further reduce the
logistics needs of fuel resupplies. These technological innovations will
be driven by defense policy and military needs and as such will be
largely independent of measures to promote energy technology in the
civilian sector. The consequences for civilian energy supply and use
arising from defense innovation could, however, be significant.
2.5. US trajectory in operational military energy decision-making
The DoD separates energy consumption into facility (or installation)
energy and operational energy, since each possess distinct character-
istics, priorities, and opportunities. Facility energy is consumed at fixed
installations and by non-tactical vehicles [89]. Operational energy is
defined in law as “the energy required for training, moving, and
sustaining military forces and weapons platforms for military opera-
tions.” [91]. Although some ambiguity exists in the delineation be-
tween these two categories, DoD's FY20113 energy consumption was
roughly 74% operational energy and 26% installation energy [89]. The
proportion of operational to installation use depends greatly on the
current level of military activities. High levels of operational use in the
first decade of this century reflect U.S. operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq [90]. In FY 2011, DoD consumed roughly 686 PJ (650 trillion BTU)
of operational energy, of which the vast majority was supplied from
petroleum-based fuels [89]. Estimates for DoD petroleum expenditures
in FY 2011 range from $15-$17 billion [89,90]. The Air Force con-
sumed the most petroleum (53% in FY 2011), followed by the De-
partment of the Navy (28%), including the Marine Corps, and the Army
(18%). All other DoD agencies accounted for the remaining 1% [90].
A DoD presentation [92] identified operational energy processes
and levers DoD can influence, including:
• Force Planning Assumptions and Defense Planning Scenarios• Requirements Development• Acquisition Programs and Rapid Fielding• Technology Priorities and Investments• Culture, Measurement, Education and Billing
DoD's petroleum consumption (and especially its volume, dis-
proportionately growing cost, and additive effect to geostrategic risks)
has been widely discussed as one of the Department's most critical
energy issues [40,61,84,90,93]. The central role of petroleum products
in DoD's energy mix is one of the most salient reasons why a large
portion of ongoing efforts have focused on reducing DoD's use of pet-
roleum through conservation, increased efficiency, and development
and deployment of alternative fuel substitutes and technologies.
The US Defense Logistics Agency - Energy (DLA-E), formerly called
the Defense Energy Support Center (DESC),4 is responsible for sup-
porting the energy needs of DoD's combat operations, which includes
the wholesale purchase, storage, and sale of fuels to DoD and other
government agencies [94]. For operational energy use, the commodity
cost of fuels purchased by DoD from DLA-E is often only a fraction of
the total costs of energy for operational use. Significant indirect costs
can be incurred by the logistical operations needed to transport and
protect these fuel supplies from DLA-E supply points to DOE operational
theaters, particularly when these theaters are in remote or politically
unstable regions of the world. The “fully burdened cost of fuel” (FBCF),
or the “fully burdened cost of energy” [95,96], varies widely depending
on the location and distance of the transport operation and, especially,
on the amount of force protection needed to guard the fuel supply
convoys. One report estimated that water and fuel delivery accounted
for 10–12% of historic casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan [87].
Schwartz et al. [90] provide a number of FBCF estimates collected from
studies conducted by DoD Armed Forces:
“In 2010, the Marine Corps estimated the fully burdened cost of fuel
in Afghanistan at between $9 to $16 per gallon if delivered by land, and
between $29 to $31 per gallon if delivered by air. An Army study es-
timated the fully burdened cost of fuel in Iraq at $9 to $45 per gallon,
depending on the type of force protection used to and the delivery
distance, while an Air Force study estimated the fully burdened cost of
fuel delivered by land at $3 to $5 per gallon and $35 to $40 per gallon
3 U.S. DoD's Fiscal Year 2011 is from October 1, 2010 to September 30, 2012.
4 From 2004 through 2008, the cost of DESC purchases from its supply net-
work increased from $5.9 billion to $18.1 billion, a significant jump due almost
entirely to increases in fuel prices. Over the same period, DESC sales to its
customers increased from $6.9 billion to $18.7 billion. The DoD is over-
whelmingly the DESC's largest customer, although the DESC sells a small
amount of energy resources to non-DoD governmental agencies, as well as to
foreign governments.
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for aerial refueling. A report by the Army Environmental Policy
Institute [87] estimated that the fully burdened cost of fuel for a Stryker
brigade in Iraq ranged from $14.13 to $17.44 per gallon ($3.73 to
$4.61 per liter).”
With fully burdened costs at this level we start to see one of the key
reasons for the defense arena to be a key driver of technological in-
novation in energy systems. An economic case for new and initially at
least, relatively high cost alternatives can be made much more easily in
a defense context than in the lower cost world of civilian energy policy
and markets.
Several industry and government reports (see e.g. Refs. [40,84,97])
have identified a critical need for DoD to develop measures to assess the
indirect energy costs of technologies and systems, and to incorporate
these measures into operational planning and acquisition processes. In
doing so, DoD would be able to compare options on the basis of their
energy performance and efficiency, along with other traditional factors,
and make superior strategic acquisition, deployment, and R&D invest-
ment decisions.
However, it wasn't until 2007 that a policy memo published by the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology,
and Logistics (OSD (AT&L)) initiated the incorporation of fully bur-
dened costs of energy considerations into acquisition decisions for three
pilot programs. Following that, the Duncan Hunter National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2009, the military budget author-
ization bill passed by Congress in 2008, required the fully burdened cost
of fuel and energy efficiency to be considered in planning, capability
requirements development, and acquisitions processes.
With analytical guidance from the Defense Science Board's report,
More Capable Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden [40], OSD (AT&
L) and the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE)
(formerly the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation) have led the
way by developing and refining guidelines for a prototype FBCF
methodology. These guidelines have been incorporated into the Defense
Acquisitions Guidebook, the DoD reference guide of best practices for
acquisitions. Within the last decade, the Armed Services have adapted
the OSD (AT&L)/CAPE methodology for their own use or developed
similar methodologies.
Notions of cost minimization and economic efficiency are attractive
to all defense departments and ministries, but acceptance of new more
efficient technologies and practices by military personnel rely largely
on a different logic. As discussed, recent asymmetric conflicts such as
Iraq and Afghanistan have relied upon extended and vulnerable supply
chains. This combines with the real and perceived isolation of forward
operating bases to yield a sense among soldiers that they would prefer
any approach that would reduce the need for fuel re-supply. Re-supply
risks soldiers' lives and the lives of support workers in ways that would
be avoided if more energy efficient systems were deployed. For the
soldiers at the front, the need for frequent re-supply represents a vul-
nerability that they would prefer to avoid.
The analysis of alternative energy integration in the military found a
focus in four areas of development:
• The area of liquid fuels continues to be an area of focus and vast
potential. Most of the innovation in the area has involved the Air
Force's and Navy's implementation of biofuel mixes. While there is
skepticism regarding the economics of this work, the continued
implementation and development of mixed fuel technologies has
been ensured by legislation [98].• Away from the front, military installations have received focus for
the energy and cost saving potentials of efficiency and renewable
energy systems. One estimate found that shifting from reliance on
diesel backup generators to advanced microgrids at installations
could save the DoD between $8 billion and $20 billion over the next
20 years [99].• The imperative of maintaining power independence in forward op-
erating bases has created demand for innovative systems. The
described difficulties of supplying fuel to generators have led to a
number of unique efficiency modifications. This system has allowed
for the development of more efficient microgrids for electrical
power distribution on military bases and installations. These in-
stallations combine the smart information technology (IT) and en-
vironmental benefits seen in civilian equivalents together with en-
hanced IT security and with a strong emphasis on reduced fuel
needs. Technological leadership in this space comes from US ac-
tivity.• The use of small-scale systems at the platoon/company level will
continue to be developed and utilized as military leaders strive to
provide small scale fighting forces independence from their fuel
tether.
The growing momentum at the time within DoD and Congress to act
regarding increasingly burdensome fuel logistics led to the establish-
ment in 2010 of a new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational
Energy Plans and Programs (ASD (OEPP)). The office was charged with
developing DoD's first operational energy strategy and providing
oversight and guidance to DoD agencies on operational energy. In 2011,
the office released the Operational Energy Strategy: Energy for the
Warfighter [100], followed by the companion Operational Energy
Strategy: Implementation Plan in 2012 [101]. The report outlined three
strategic goals:
• More fight, less fuel: reduce energy demand and increase energy
efficiency• More options, less risk: diversify energy sources and reduce depen-
dence on external energy infrastructure, particularly the U.S. com-
mercial electricity grid• More capability, less cost: incorporate energy considerations into
DoD institutions and processes, particularly for planning and ac-
quisitions
The unique energy perspective of the military is also relevant in how
technologies are shared amongst allied forces. Through foreign military
sales, joint exercises and international basing, DoD can promote
adoption of shared technical standards and directly influence the en-
ergy systems used by its allies [102]. The sharing of research and de-
velopment and the constant push for standardization could lead to a
beneficial dissemination of standardized new energy technologies to
allied countries where the process of military technology pathways to
commercial use can take place.
2.6. Energy decision-making for military installations
Energy is also consumed in the lighting, cooling, heating, commu-
nications, transport, and other energy services needed at defense in-
stallations. In FY 2011, DoD consumed 236 PJ (224 trillion BTU) of
installation energy at a cost of $4.1 billion [89]. Buildings accounted
for 95% of consumption, while non-tactical vehicles made up 5%.
Electricity and natural gas supplied the majority of installation energy
(48% and 32%, respectively) [89], which was roughly analogous to the
U.S. commercial sector's energy mix of 52% electricity and 38% natural
gas in 2011 [88]. Worldwide, DoD manages more than 500 installations
with around 300,000 buildings [89]. The DoD is required to construct
and operate facilities consistent with minimizing life cycle costs, which
often include energy and efficiency investments as program elements,
however information gaps and other barriers remain [103]. The Army
consumed the most installation energy (36% in FY 2011), followed by
the Air Force (30%), and the Department of the Navy (28%), including
the Marine Corps (DOD, 2012). All other DoD agencies accounted for
the remaining 6%.
One of Former President Obama's first energy acts was enacting
Executive Order 13514 on Federal Sustainability [104]. By issuing this
order, the President made the government's “goal [to] lower costs,
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reduce pollution, and shift Federal energy expenses away from oil and
towards local, clean energy” [105]. The US Federal Governments in-
ternal goal of 28% reduction in GHG by 2020 has created greater em-
phasis within departments (DoD/DOE) to reduce fuel use and elec-
tricity, and permitted much energy technology research and
development using federal resources. Here there are linkages to long-
standing critiques from Europe that while the US tends to avoid poli-
tical discourse on the themes of industrial strategy or industrial policy
perhaps with a sense that such thinking is “un-American”. Critical
Europeans have argued that such policy is alive and well in the US
hidden within vast federal programs with other nominal missions, such
as national defense.
Growing global awareness and action toward reducing greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions have led the U.S. federal government to imple-
ment several initiatives to reduce federal energy consumption and GHG
emissions. These federal mandates have applied to the majority of
DoD's vast array of fixed installations in the U.S. and abroad.
Additionally, US DoD concerns about its reliance on commercial net-
works and infrastructure, particularly the U.S. electricity grid, have
provided further impetus for energy innovation at its stationary facil-
ities. Increasingly, fixed installations are directly engaged in opera-
tional missions in foreign theaters (for example through the command
of unmanned aerial vehicles) as well as serve as local command centers
for national relief and recovery efforts and Homeland defense missions.
However, these installations rely heavily on a U.S. commercial elec-
tricity grid that is increasingly vulnerable to outages due to both acci-
dents and intentional physical or cyber attacks [106]. Current methods
of providing back-up power to installations are highly inefficient,
costly, and fragmented [84].
While DoD's combat and tactical facilities, vehicles, and systems are
largely exempt from these federal regulations, most of the agency's
fixed installations and non-tactical vehicle fleets do fall under these
regulations. And, in fact, they make up a very large proportion of
federal facilities and fleets:
• In FY 2007, the total footprint and energy consumption (176 million
m2 and 216 PJ, respectively) of DoD buildings subject to federal
energy reduction requirements was more than the total building
footprint and energy consumption of all other agencies combined
(102 million m2 and 156 PJ, respectively) [107].• In FY 2011, DoD fleet vehicles made up 30% of federal fleet vehicles
and 24% of federal fleet fuel consumption (GSA Federal Fleet Report
2011).
Key requirements include:
• Produce or procure 25% of facility energy consumption by FY2025
(10 USC § 2911)• Meters capable of recording energy consumption at least hourly and
providing data at least daily installed in all federal buildings by
October 1, 2012 (EPAct 2005).• A 30% reduction in energy intensity (energy consumption per gross
square foot (gsf)) of federal buildings by FY 2015 using a FY 2003
baseline (EISA 2007, EO 13423).• A 55% reduction in fossil fuel-generated energy consumption in new
federal buildings by 2010, increasing to 100% reduction by 2030,
compared to a similar building in FY 2003 (EISA 2007).• Net zero energy consumption by 2030 for new federal buildings
designed in 2020 or later (EO 13514).• At least 7.5% of federal electricity consumption to be sourced from
renewable resources by FY 2013. Renewable energy generated on-
site or on other federal or Native American lands can receive double
credit (EPAct 2005).
Because of this, the federal mandates have initiated a flurry of ac-
tivity by DoD component entities to develop and implement renewable
energy deployment strategies, build institutional capacity on facility
energy management, and develop partnerships with other federal
agencies as well as private sector organizations to fund energy research
& development projects. Recent assessments of DoD efforts in both al-
ternative financing for energy projects and energy saving contracts
revealed the need for better data collection to measure and verify
performance across the portfolio of projects [108,109]. Because of the
number and scale of military energy projects, it is essential that per-
formance data and project challenges be collected, so that both DoD
and the civilian sector can learn from and improve upon these efforts.
The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations &
Environment (DUSD (I&E)) office is responsible for managing military
installation assets and services, including overseeing the installation of
energy management programs and policies. At the request of Congress,
the office released in 2005 the DoD Renewable Energy Assessment Final
Report, which detailed the results of a study conducted to assess the
potential to develop renewable energy resources on, or near, military
installations, along with a companion Implementation Plan. Hence the
DoD has initiated at considerable scale, a R&D and procurement ac-
tivities across its portfolio of operational and installation energy uses.
These investments have cascading impacts on innovation and the ci-
vilian energy sector.
US administrations change, and new administrations issue new de-
fense policy priorities, and revoke or modify previous directives. The
new National Security Strategy of the United States issued in 2017
stresses a posture of energy dominance and promoting energy exports,
but also still highlights the importance of energy innovation and the
need to balance energy security, economic development, and environ-
mental protection [110]. As the energy requirements increase for dis-
mounted soldiers, installations, and major weapons systems, so too will
the relationship of energy to broader defense capabilities. Defense-led
energy innovation will continue to be a driver of change in both the
military and civilian sectors.
3. Conclusion
Energy has always been a strategic input to warfighting, but was
typically viewed as the purview of logistics planners. Security, eco-
nomic, and environmental factors have recently elevated energy to be
considered as a system-wide strategic lever in the military, which will
have lasting and positive results for war-fighting capabilities, and ul-
timately the civilian energy sector.
In this paper, we argued there is a long history of energy and de-
fense interactions and these interactions apply in policy, strategy, and
tactics. Furthermore, defense innovation has long led to civilian tech-
nological improvements in many technological areas, perhaps most
notably in aerospace. We are now on the cusp of a possible similar
technological transfer in the domain of energy technology. Defense can
lead the way for economic reasons as well as a result of more direct
military concerns. For example, for war-fighting in recent decades the
US military has faced an extremely high fully burdened cost of fuel.
Those very high costs favor moves to innovative approaches far earlier
than would be seen in civilian contexts where prices and costs of es-
tablished options are far lower. We recommend such questions for
further research. We see these pressures in the defense context only
growing further favoring defense-led innovation. Of course, non-state
actors, belligerent states, and other adversaries may not value reduced
environmental impacts or greenhouse gas emissions from military op-
erations. But defense-led energy innovation from the U.S. and NATO
member countries will only advance operational technologies and
strategies that increase military capabilities, competitive advantages,
and combat lethality in theaters of conflict. Hence efforts focused on
improving environmental or energy performance of military activities
could induce additional innovations in warfighting capabilities such as
reduced logistics requirements or costs, resilient and low-signature off-
grid power systems, or enterprise cost savings that adversaries are not
C. Samaras, et al. Energy Strategy Reviews 26 (2019) 100409
8
investing in nor benefiting from. In addition, more fuel-efficient major
weapons systems and reduced logistics requirements can potentially
partially offset some Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2/AD) efforts by
adversaries. Finally, the recent emphasis on life cycle cost effectiveness
and energy savings from installations will both reduce operating costs
and enhance the resilience of these installations.
Alongside these developments, the issue of anthropogenic climate
change has become a major international concern. While this paper
does not directly concern itself with the impacts of a changing global
climate on international relations, potential conflict, and military cap-
abilities, there are clear points of interaction between this paper and
that literature. This paper sees how climate change policies are af-
fecting not only civilian innovation but also policy and decision making
in defense contexts (nationally and inter-governmentally, such as in UN
peacekeeping).
Military and defense innovations are now showing positive devel-
opments in the energy and environmental areas. Whether the changing
nature of energy supply and use in military planning and tactics re-
presents a revolution in military affairs remains an unanswered ques-
tion, but we see the potential for a major shift emerging from the
military arena where it may even achieve the status of a revolution in
military affairs. We observe that there is an unhelpful separation, or-
ganizationally, and socially, between experts involved in civilian en-
ergy policy and innovation and their colleagues concerned about
military strategy, planning, and capabilities. We suggest that those
concerned about civilian energy technology and policy should do more
to consider innovations and potential innovations emerging from the
defense sector, and leverage two-way technology spillovers. We suggest
there is a growing opportunity for a reverse flow (civilian to military) in
energy innovation especially as one considers the greening of military
operations. The advantages lie not just in looking at the present and the
past, but also (where possible) into the future. These opportunities for
mutually beneficial exchange have considerable potential to transform
the ways both the defense and civilian sectors use and manage energy.
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